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Abstract 
The notion of flexicurity promotes the idea of compensation of labour market deregulation (= 
flexibilization) with advantages in employment and social security. To monitor effects of 
flexicurity policies in Europe, flexicurity indicators are constructed. The European flexicurity 
polices are analyzed in the neo-liberal perspective, from the trade-unionist viewpoint, and 
within the conception of European welfare state. The empirical investigation shows that, 
contrary to political promises and theoretical considerations, the deregulation of European 
labour markets is absolutely predominating. To surmount this policy contradiction, a so called 
flexinsurance is proposed, meaning that the employer's contribution to social security should 
be proportional to the flexibility of the contract/risk of becoming unemployed.  
Keywords: flexicurity, labour market flexibility, social security, composite indicators.  
 
JEL Classification: 
•  
• C43  Index Numbers and Aggregation 
• C51  Model Construction and Estimation 
• J21  Labor Force and Employment, Size, and Structure 
• J26  Retirement; Retirement Policies 
• J65  Unemployment Insurance; Severance Pay; Plant Closings 
• J83  Workers' Rights 
• J88  Public Policy 
 
Monitoring der Flexicurity-Politiken in Europe von drei 
verschiedenen Standpunkten 
Das Konzept Flexicurity umfasst die Kompensation der Arbeitsmarktderegulierung               
(= Flexibilisierung) durch Fortschritte in der Beschäftigungssicherheit und sozialen 
Sicherheit. Um die  Flexicurity-Politiken in Europa nachzuvollziehen, werden Flexicurity-
Indikatoren entwickelt. Die europäischen Flexicurity-Politiken werden in der neo-liberalen 
Perspektive, vom gewerkschaftlichen Standpunkt und im Rahmen der Konzeption des 
europäischen Wohlfahrtsstaates analysiert. Die empirische Studie zeigt, dass entgegen 
politischer Versprechungen und theoretischer Betrachtungen die Deregulierung der 
europäischen Arbeitsmärkte absolut dominiert. Um den politischen Widerspruch zu 
beseitigen, wird eine so genannte Flexinsurance (= Flexicurity-Versicherung) vorgeschlagen. 
Der Beitragsanteil des Arbeitgebers zu den sozialen Kassen soll proportional zu der 
Flexibilität des Arbeitsvertrages und dem entsprechenden Risiko der Arbeitslosigkeit gebildet 
werden. 
Stichwörter: Flexicurity, Arbeitsmarktflexibilität, soziale Sicherheit, zusammengesetzte 
Indikatoren. 
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Introduction 
A general flexibilization of employment relations is already adopted by the European Union 
as a means to enhance economic performance and to support sustainable development. 
Employers wish to share the burdens of competition with employees, and politicians seek to 
shift the responsibility for employment from the state to individuals. The solidarity is getting 
to be restricted to those who are unable to receive a sufficient income, and the adherents of 
the economically more competitive and socially more “hard” Anglo-Saxon model are 
becoming more influential.  
In most of the post-war Europe, employment relations were regulated by rather constraining 
employment protection legislation and by collective agreements between employers and trade 
unions. The actual contradiction between the flexibilization pursued by employers and strict 
labour market regulation defended by trade unions makes topical the discussion on 
flexibilization and employment protection legislation with regard to economical performance 
and unemployment.  
The advantages and disadvantages of labour market regulation/flexibility versus employment 
were investigated by numerous scholars; for a review focusing on European welfare states as 
defined by Esping-Andersen (1990) see Esping-Andersen (2000a–b). As concluded by 
Esping-Andersen (2000b, p. 99), "the link between labour market regulation and employment 
is hard to pin down". The same empirical evidence, that unemployment is practically 
independent of the strictness of employment protection legislation, was reported by the 
OECD (1999b, pp. 47–132). There were even cases when the same legislative changes caused 
different effects. For instance, the impact of almost equal deregulation measures on the use of 
fixed-term contracts "was sharply different" in Germany and Spain (OECD, 1999, p. 71).  
At the same time, a good labour market performance under little regulation was inherent in 
the Anglo-Saxon model, that is, USA, Canada, United Kingdom, and Australia (Esping-
Andrsen 2000a). The deregulation of labour market in the Netherlands, which had a different 
kind of economy, coincided with the "Dutch miracle" of the 1990s (Visser and Hemerijck 
1997, Gorter 2000, van Oorschot 2000). A similar Danish practice in the background of 
"Eurosclerosis" (Esping-Andersen 2000a, p. 67) was successful as well (Björklund 2000, 
Braun 2001, Madsen 2004). All of these convinced some scholars and politicians of the 
harmlessness and even usefulness of labour market deregulation. It was believed that 
employment flexibility improved competitiveness of firms and thereby stimulated production, 
which in turn stimulated labour markets.  
The claims for flexibilization met a hard resistance, especially in countries with old traditions 
of struggle for labour rights. Wilthagen and Tros (2004, p. 179) reported with a reference to 
Korver (2001) that the Green Paper: Partnership for a New Organisation of Work of the 
European Commission (1997) "which promoted the idea of social partnership and balancing 
flexibility and security" got a very negative response from French and German trade unions, 
because "the idea of partnership represents a threat to the independence of unions and a denial 
of the importance of worker’s rights and positions, notably at the enterprise level". The ILO 
published a report, concluding that "the flexibilization of the labour market has led to a 
significant erosion of worker’s rights in fundamentally important areas which concern their 
employment and income security and (relative) stability of their working and living 
conditions" (Ozaki 1999, p. 116).  
To handle the growing flexibility of employment relations with lower job security and 
decreasing eligibility to social benefits, the notion of flexicurity has been introduced. 
Wilthagen and Tros (2004) ascribe its conception to a member of the Dutch Scientific 
Council of Government Policy, Professor Hans Adriaansens, and the Dutch Minister of Social 
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Affairs, Ad Melkert (Labour Party). In the autumn of 1995 Adriaansens launched this catchy 
word in speeches and interviews, having defined it as a shift from job security towards 
employment security. He suggested compensating the decreasing job security (fewer 
permanent jobs and easier dismissals) by improving employment opportunities and social 
security.  
For instance, a relaxation of the employment protection legislation was supposed to be 
counterbalanced by providing improvements to temporary and part-time workers, supporting 
life-long professional training which facilitates changes of jobs, more favorable regulation of 
working time, and additional social benefits. In December 1995 Ad Melkert presented a 
memorandum Flexibility and Security, on the relaxation of the employment protection 
legislation of permanent workers, provided that temporary workers got regular employment 
status, without however adopting the concept of flexicurity as such. By the end of 1997 the 
Dutch parliament accepted flexibility/security proposals and shaped them into laws which 
came in force in 1999. 
The OECD (2004b, p. 97–98) ascribes the flexicurity to Denmark with its traditionally weak 
employment protection, highly developed social security, and easiness to find a job; see also  
Madsen (2004) and Breedgaard et al. (2005). Regardless of the priority in inventing the word 
flexicurity, both countries were recognized "good-practice examples" (Braun 2001, van 
Oorschot 2001, Kok et al. 2004) and inspired the international flexicurity debate. Although 
some authors still consider flexicurity a specific Dutch/Danish phenomenon (Gorter 2000), 
the idea spread all over Europe in a few years; for a selection of recent international 
contributions see Jepsen and Klammer (2004). At the Lisbon summit of 2000 the EU had 
already referred to this concept (Vielle and Walthery 2003, p. 2; Keller and Seifert 2004, p. 
227, Kok et al. 2004), and after the meeting in Villach in January 2006 flexicurity became a 
top theme in the European Commission (European Commission 2006).  
Since the concept is rather new, there is neither an "official" definition of flexicurity, nor 
means for its quantitative characterization. This study attempts to operationally define 
flexicurity, and to apply this definition to reflect three viewpoints: of neo-liberals, of 
European welfarism, and of trade unions. The flexicurity indices for European countries for 
the recent years are derived from several types of data available form the OECD, European 
Commission, and Eurostat. The factual rather than purely legislative situation is reflected by 
weighting institutional indicators with the variable size of employment and unemployment 
groups with different eligibility to social security benefits.  
The results are not encouraging. Contrary to theoretical opinions and political promises, the 
current deregulation of European labour markets is not adequately compensated by 
improvements in social security. Flexibilization resulted in an increase of unemployment and 
in a disproportional growth of the number of atypically employed (= other than permanent 
full-time, like part-time, fixed-term) or self-employed (Eurostat 2005, Schmid and Gazier 
2002). After the flexicurity advantages/disadvantages have been accounted proportionally to 
the size of the groups affected, the factual trends turn out to be negative even from the 
viewpoint of neo-liberals, to say nothing of European welfarism and of trade unions. The 
reciprocity between the advantages/disadvantages is illusory, because gains are smaller than 
losses and winners are fewer than losers. Thus the study warns against promoting flexicurity 
policies with no operational control and empirical feedback. To surmount negative effects, a 
so called flexinsurance is proposed, meaning that the employer's contribution to social 
security should be proportional to the flexibility of the contract/risk of becoming unemployed.  
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Flexicurity as flexibility–security trade-offs  
Wilthagen and Tros (2004, p. 169) define flexicurity as follows:  
Definition 1.  [Flexicurity is] a policy strategy that attempts, synchronically and in a 
deliberate way, to enhance the flexibility of labour markets, work organization and labour 
relations on the one hand, and to enhance security — employment security and social security 
— notably for weak groups in and outside the labour market on the other hand.  
It is emphasized (p. 170) that flexicurity is not "simply social protection for flexible work 
forces as Klammer and Tillmann (2001), Ferrera et al (2001) and many others tend to analyze 
it". According to Wilthagen and Tros (2004, p. 167), flexicurity policies aim at increasing the 
competitiveness of European economies by their further liberalization, attaining a 
compromise between employers, who seek for the deregulation of labour markets, and 
employees, who wish to protect their rights. It explicitly manifests itself in the description of 
flexicurity as a flexibility versus security trade-off (cf. with the word "deliberate" in the above 
definition); see Visser and Hemerijck (1997, p. 44), Wilthagen and Tros (2004, p. 171), 
Kronauer and Linne (2005), and Ramaux (2006). Let us consider notions Flexibility and 
Security in some detail to better understand which trade is proposed. 
The Flexibility stands for a multivariate aggregate which, according to the OECD (1989, p. 
13–20), includes: 
• External numerical flexibility (employment flexibility by Standing 1999, p. 101–114;  
numerical flexibility by Regini 2000, p. 16, external quantitative flexibility by Vielle 
and Walthery 2003, p.8) defined as the employer's ability to adjust the number of 
employees to current needs. In other words, it is the ease of "hiring and firing" which 
manifests itself in the mobility of workers between employers (external job turnover). 
• Internal numerical flexibility (work process or functional flexibility by Standing 1999, 
p. 114–116; temporal flexibility by Regini 2000, p. 17, internal quantitative flexibility 
by Vielle and Walthery 2003, p.8) which is the employer's ability to modify the 
number and distribution of working hours with no change of the number of 
employees. It appears in shiftworking, seasonal changes in the demand for labour, 
weekend/holiday working, overtime and variable hours, see also Keller and Seifert 
(2004, p. 228). 
• Functional flexibility (job structure flexibility by Standing 1999, p. 117–124; internal-
functional flexibility by Keller and Seifert 2004, p. 228, internal qualitative flexibility 
by Vielle and Walthery 2003, p. 8), that is, the employers' ability to move their 
employees from one task or department to another, or to change the content of their 
work.  It is reflected by the mobility of workers within enterprises (internal labour 
turnover), see also Regini (2000, p. 16). 
• Wage flexibility (flexible or variable pay by Wilthagen and Tros 2004, p. 171), which 
enables employers to alter wages in response to changing labour market or 
competitive conditions. Typically, employers seek for applying individual 
performance-linked rewarding systems additionally to (or instead of) usual collective 
agreements independent of individual performance, see also Regini (2000, p. 16–17, 
19–21). 
• Externalization flexibility (external functional flexibility by Keller and Seifert 2004, p. 
228; one of constituents of job structure flexibility by Standing 1999, p. 123; external 
qualitative flexibility by Vielle and Walthery 2003, p. 8, that is, the employers' ability 
 9
   
to order some works from external workers or firms without employment contracts but 
with commercial contracts in such forms as distance working, teleworking, virtual 
organizations, and entreployees, that is, self-entrepreneurial activities, see Pongratz 
and Voß (2003). 
The notion of Security also includes several issues. For instance, Standing (1999, p. 52) 
enumerates seven types of security. They are not all relevant to the flexicurity debate, like 
labour market security through state-guaranteed full employment in socialist countries. 
Within the debate Vielle and Walthery (2003, p. 18–19), following Dupeyroux and Ruellan 
(1998),  focus the attention at compensatory functions of securities in case of unemployment, 
illness, advancing age, maternity, invalidity, as well as exceptional medical or family burdens 
(decommodification in the sense of Esping-Andersen (1990)). More specifically, Wilthagen, 
Tros and van Lieshout (2003, p. 4) restrict consideration to the following four types of 
security: 
• Job security (employment security by Standing (1999, p. 52)), `the certainty of 
retaining a specific job with a specific employer' . It is guaranteed by the protection of 
employees against dismissals and against significant changes of working conditions. 
This is the main subject of the employment protection legislation. 
• Employment/employability security (job security by Standing (1999, p. 52)), the 
`certainty of remaining at work (not necessarily with the same employer)'. It means 
the availability of jobs for dismissed and unemployed, corresponding to their 
qualification and previous working conditions. The employability of job seekers can 
be improved by life-long professional training which can be offered both by 
employers and by training programs within active labour market policies; see Keller 
and Seifert (2004, p. 235). Tros (2004, p. 5) also mentions entreployees, organization 
of firm-firm job pools, and facilities for work-work transitions. 
• Income (social) security, the `income protection in the event that paid work ceases'. 
Standing considers it more generally as protection of income through minimum wage 
machinery, wage indexation, comprehensive social security, including progressive 
taxation, provisions for old age (post-employment security by Keller and Seifert 2004, 
p. 236–238),  etc. 
• Combination security (not considered by other authors cited), "the certainty of being 
able to combine paid work with other social responsibilities and obligations. This last 
form of security cannot be traced back to the other forms of security". Tros (2004, p. 
5) explains it further as a work-life balance, work-family balance, early flexible part-
time retirement, flexible working hours, and leave facilities. 
Thus, a flexicurity policy is imagined as an increase in the five types of flexibility 
compensated by improvements in four types of security.  
Tracing flexicurity trade-offs with matrices 
Matrices like in Table 1 are often suggested "as a heuristic tool to trace flexicurity policies as 
specific trade-offs" (Wilthagen and Tros 2004, p. 171). The cells of the table show policy 
measures relevant to the intersecting types of flexibility and security. Some measures are 
multi-relevant, like entreployees, appearing at several row/column intersections. Such tables 
well illustrate the compound structure of Flexibility and Security but at a closer look fail to 
describe flexicurity trade-offs. 
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Table 1. The matrix aimed at tracing flexibility versus security trade-offs with a flexicurity policy for 
older workers as given by Tros (2004) 
 Job security 
 
Employment security
 
Income 
security 
Combination 
security 
 
External 
numerical 
flexibility 
 
 Firm-firm job pools 
Facilities work-work 
transitions 
Older enterployees 
Retirement 
arrangements 
 
 
Internal 
numerical 
flexibility 
 
Part-time work 
Flexible retirement 
Part-time enterployees 
 
 Flexible 
retirement 
 
Part-time retirement 
Flexible age (pre-
pension 
Flexible working 
hours 
Leave facilities 
 
Functional 
flexibility 
 
Education/training 
Adaptation in working 
hours/ tasks 
 
Education/training 
Seniority/bridge works 
Job rotation 
Age-aware cereer and 
job structures 
  
 
 
Table 2. The Dutch Law on Flexibility and Security (extraction) from January 1, 1999, as given by 
Wilthagen and Tros (2004), which cannot be inscribed into Table 1 
Flexibility Security 
• Adjustment of the regulation of 
fixed-term employment contracts: 
after 3 consecutive contracts or 
when the total length of 
consecutive contracts totals 3 
years or more, a permanent 
contract exists (previously this 
applied to fixed-term contracts 
that had been extended once). 
• The obligation of temporary work 
agencies (TWA) to be in 
possession of a permit has been 
withdrawn. The maximum term 
for this type of employment 
(formerly 6 months) is abolished 
as well. 
• The notice period is in principle 1 
month and 4 months at maximum 
(used to be 6 months). 
 
• Introduction of so-called presumptions of law which 
strengthen the position of atypical workers (regarding the 
existence of an employment contract and the number of 
working hours agreed in that contract); the existence of an 
employment contract is more easily presumed. 
• A minimum entitlement to three hours’ pay for on-call 
workers each time they are called in to work. 
• Regulation of the risk of non-payment of wages in the event 
of there being no work for an on-call worker: the period over 
which employers may claim that they need not pay wages for 
hours not worked has been reduced to six months. 
• A worker’s contract with a TWA is considered a regular 
employment contract; only in the first 26 weeks are the 
agency and the agency worker allowed a certain degree of 
freedom with respect to starting and ending the employment 
relationship. 
• Special dismissal protection has been introduced for 
employees engaged in trade union activities. 
 
 
Firstly, there is no space for locating deregulation-only measures or purely security 
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innovations. In particular, the Dutch Law on Flexibility and Security summarized in Table 2 
(by the same authors) cannot be inscribed into Table 1. The Dutch Law consists of a number 
of items, each contributing either to flexibility, or to security. The cells of Table 1, on the 
contrary, combine certain types of flexibility and security simultaneously. 
Secondly, Table 1 classifies policy measures into flexibility/security types instead of 
describing the flexibility/security compensation (trade-off). Such a simultaneous 
classification makes policy measures ambiguous (in favour of flexibility or security?) which, 
concealing the compensation issues, creates an illusion of a "deliberate" solution. Moreover, 
debits can be presented as credits following the proverb "Every cloud has a silver lining". 
For instance, consider ‘Firm-firm job pools’ at the intersection of row External numerical 
flexibility and column Employment security. If it is a flexibility measure to "softly" dismiss 
workers (it stands in the row External numerical flexibility) then there should be an 
equivalent social compensation which is missed. If it is a security measure against easy 
dismissals (it stands in the column Employment security) then it is too weak because it 
provides poorer career opportunities than retaining the same job. If it is thought to combine 
flexibility and security then the degree of compensation should be indicated. 
Another way of classifying flexibility/security combinations has been used by Sperber (2006) 
with a reference to ILO (Auer 2005, Auer and Cazas 2002) and OECD (2004). Table 3 
classifies countries with respect to two indicators: strictness of employment protection 
legislation (EPL) and of social protection (UIB —unemployment insurance benefits). Here, 
each matrix dimension represents two grades of one indicator rather than several types of 
flexibility or security. Besides, countries are specified with unemployment rate regarded as an 
evaluation measure of institutional arrangements (Blanchard 2004, OECD 2004). Other 
evaluation measures can be GDP growth (Pissarides 2000–2001, Blanchard 2006), job 
security (Auer and Cazas 2002), or some political criterion. 
Table 3. Institutional arrangements and unemployment rate (Sperber 2006 with reference to OECD 2004) 
Social security (UIB — unemployment insurance benefits) Strictness of employment 
protection legislation (EPL) Low High 
High Japan                  
Employment protection 14 
Social protection 4 
Unemployment rate 4.7% 
France                
Employment protection 21 
Social protection 20 
Unemployment rate 9.3% 
Low USA (1,3)          
Employment protection 1 
Social protection 3 
Unemployment rate 4.0% 
Denmark (8,27)  
Employment protection 8 
Social protection 27 
Unemployment rate 4.4% 
 
As one can see, Table 3 provides a flexibility/security evaluation but is not appropriate for 
displaying several flexibility or security types. Table 3 can also be misleading, prompting that 
the less regulation the better, which is not applicable to all countries. 
Thus, Wilthagen's matrix emphasizes the many-sidedness of flexibility and security but does 
not reflect flexibility/security compensation rates to trace trade-offs. The ILO–OECD matrix 
is aimed at flexibility/security evaluation but fails to operate on more than one flexibility and 
one security dimension, and the flexibility/security evaluation can be tendentious.  
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Figure 1. A flexicurity policy along a tradeoff ‘Flexibility versus security’ 
 
 
 
Monitoring flexicurity policies in a vector space 
To combine advantages of both approaches cited do the following. Transform two dimensions 
of Table 3 into continuous axes. The resulting two-dimensional plane is shown in Figure 1. 
The frontal horizontal axis Strictness of EPL displays the strictness of employment protection 
legislation measured in some conditional %. The strictness grows from left to right, implying 
flexibility at the left hand and rigidity at the right hand: 
Flexibility = 100% – Strictness of EPL . 
The second axis Security shows the aggregated social security also measured in some 
conditional %. States of the society are depicted by points (vectors) in the two-dimensional 
plane Strictness of EPL–Security. Each country, being specified with two indicators, can be 
depicted as a vector in this plane. 
If five types of flexibility and four types of security should be considered as in the Wilthagen 
matrix, then the horizontal axes in Figure 1 split into five flexibility and four security axes, 
respectively. The horizontal axes in Figure 1 can be regarded as aggregates of several 
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dimensions. 
In the given paper we consider but two main factors of flexicurity, Strictness of EPL and 
Social (income) security. Recall that the flexicurity debate originates from claims to relax the 
EPL which constrains the external numerical flexibility. Consequently, the Strictness of EPL 
can be regarded as an indicator of the External numerical flexibility which plays the key role 
in the debate. The strictness of EPL and generosity of social security benefits are often 
regarded as main regulators of labour markets (Blanchard and Tirole 2004). 
To speak of a trade-off, one has to assume a social preference. A preference is usually 
represented by a utility function which takes greater values at more preferable points and 
remains constant at equivalent points joined into indifference curves (= trade-offs). The 
indifference curves are but points of the same height at the utility hill; see Figure 1. The 
utility function implements the evaluation measure, and remaining at indifference curves 
means that a decrease in employment protection is "deliberately" compensated by an increase 
in social security. 
For, instance, suppose that a country in 1995 and in 2000 is characterized by vectors 1995 = 
(EPL1995, S1995) and 2000 = (EPL2000, S2000), respectively. If the flexicurity policy is 
implemented correctly then the vector 2000 lies in the indifference curve through 1995 as in 
Figure 1. If vector 2000 lied in the red Pareto-worsening domain (more flexibility under no 
improvement in security) then it would mean that a deregulation-only policy takes place. 
Such a representation allows us to introduce an operational definition of flexicurity. 
Definition 2 (operational) A "flexicure" country" is the one which vector is located close to 
the high flexibility–high security edge of the flexibility–security rectangle. Pursuing a 
flexicurity policy corresponds to a motion of the country's vector in the plane "Strictness of 
EPL–Social security" along an indifference curve of social utility towards lower strictness of 
EPL and higher social security (‘North-West’). 
This definition covers both static and dynamic aspects of flexicurity. The reference to 
indifference curves introduces the flexibility-security compensation rates. Since a vector 
space can have an arbitrary number of dimensions, several types of flexibility and security 
can be considered. 
The social utility function can reflect different viewpoints with particular compensation rates 
(= trade-offs, as understood by the EU, national governments, or trade-unions), emphasize 
certain aspects of social protection, or it can be a macroeconomic indicator depending on both 
factors, like unemployment rate or GDP growth (Pissarides 2000–2001, OECD 2004, 
Blanchard 2004–2006). However, the agreement (!) that flexibility should be compensated by 
security means that the more employment protection and the more social protection, the better 
(otherwise no compensation is required). In turn it implies that the Pareto-worsening and 
Pareto-bettering domains (directions of simultaneous deterioration and simultaneous 
improvement, respectively) are independent of the shape of utility hill. This property is very 
important for our future analysis, since we do not know utility functions of European 
countries. 
Empirical investigation in the neo-liberal perspective 
For modeling the neo-liberal viewpoint, we need first of all two empirical indicators of 
flexibility and security as they are understood by neo-liberals. For the labour market 
flexibility, use the OECD (1999b, 2004b) indicator "Strictness of employment protection 
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legislation" (EPL) for evaluating permanent/temporary employment and the easiness of 
collective dismissals.  
The OECD indicator is aimed at reflecting institutional EPL-levels. To trace actual policies 
we have to reflect factual rather than intentional state of affairs. The employment protection is 
often conditioned by the employment status, for instance, permanently employed are 
generally better protected than temporary employed. Therefore, to estimate the national 
average, we take the weighted EPL-indicator with weights being proportional to the size of 
corresponding employment groups (yearly data on their size are available from Eurostat 
2004). Thus the national indicator varies due to institutional changes (laws) and due to 
mobility between employment groups; see Tangian (2004a–b, 2005a) for details. 
Define the second indicator, "Social security", basing on the OECD (2002b) summary of 
social security benefits; for the updated regulation see European Commission (2004). The 
OECD understands social security as a compound of five social security benefits: 
unemployment insurance, public pensions, paid sick leave, paid maternity leave, and paid 
holidays2. The eligibility to the benefits depends on the country's laws and on the employment 
status (= adherence to employment groups), differing for different employment groups. For 
example, normally employed are better secured than atypically employed. If the first group is 
large and the second is small then the social security of the society is quite high. However, if 
the first group is small and the second is large then, under the same jurisdiction, the social 
security level should be considered low. Therefore, the factual rather than institutional social 
security in a country is the weighted average indicator of social groups with the weights being 
proportional to their size. 
Within the flexicurity debate, Klammer and Tillmann (2001, p. 514) and Hoffmann and 
Walwei (2000) provide a classification of employment types with respect to four dichotomic 
indicators: permanent/fixed-term, full-time/part-time, employed/self-employed, and in 
agriculture/not in agriculture. For self-employed the discrimination between "permanent" and 
"fixed-term" is not relevant, and from 24=16 employment groups it remains eight. Thus we 
obtain 8 employment groups in each of 16 countries, totally 128 groups3. 
The country's composite indicator of social security is weighted proportionally to the size of 
employment groups. It also varies due to institutional changes (laws) and due to mobility 
between employment groups. For details see Tangian (2004a–b and 2005a). 
As for the social utility function, it is not necessary to define it explicitly at the moment, 
because the country trajectories mainly go into the Pareto-worsening domain (deregulation 
with no social security compensation), which is independent of the shape of social utility 
function. 
Figure 2 displays dynamical trajectories of European countries in the horizontal plane of 
Figure 1, Strictness of EPL–Security. The simplest social utility function u = (Strictness of 
EPL + Security)/2 is shown by indifference lines. The social preference increases in the 
‘North-East’ direction, decreases in the ‘South-West’ direction, and remains constant  along 
the diagonal indifference lines. 
                                                 
2 Entitlement to paid holidays is usually not considered within the flexicurity debate. It is not quite logical. 
Securities are aimed at compensating income losses and exceptional medical and family burdens, including 
vacations. Therefore, no entitlement to paid holidays discriminates those flexibly employed who work few 
hours, under short-time contracts, or self-employed, which should be taken into account. 
3 The authors cited consider no labour market outsiders as suggested by Wilthagen and Tros (2004). 
Respectively, we do not consider them here, also because flexicurity deals with the flexibility of employment 
relations. 
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The flexicure countries with a high flexibility and a high security are located in the top-left 
corner (Denmark and Finland). The inflexicure countries with a low flexibility (= high 
Strictness of EPL) and a high index of Security are located in the top-right corner of the chart 
(Sweden and the Netherlands). The only outlier in the left-bottom corner with high flexibility 
and low social security indicator is the flex-insecure United Kingdom. The bottom-right 
corner is occupied by inflex-insecure countries with a strict employment protection legislation 
and relatively little advanced social security (Spain, Portugal, and Czech Republic).  
The pursuing a flexicurity policy means the direction of a country’s trajectory towards the 
‘North-West’. It is inherent in Denmark in the 1990s and the Netherlands in the late 1990s, 
when the flexicurity debate was initiated. Since the exact slope of indifference curves is not 
known, it is unclear whether the flexibility-security compensation was ‘deliberate’, but at 
least a flexicurity development cannot be denied.  
All directions between ‘West’ and ‘South’ correspond to Pareto-worsening for all imaginable 
social utility functions (no improvement in both factors—no compensation comes in 
question). Since, with the only short-time exceptions for Denmark and Netherlands, all 
trajectories are directed towards ‘South’, ‘South-West’, or ‘West’, the deregulation-only 
policies are unambiguously prevailing, whereas the much promoted flexicurity is 
practically invisible.  
Empirical investigation from the trade-unionist viewpoint 
According to the viewpoint so long discussed, the relaxation of the EPL required by 
employers can be equivalently compensated by better social security benefits to workers. 
However, from the viewpoint of trade unions, first of all French and German, flexibilization 
of employment relations can be hardly compensated by social security benefits, and giving up 
labour rights for social advantages is not appropriate. Even if each particular compromise 
seems more or less fair, their succession can lead away from the social status quo and the 
employees can finally get nothing or very little for their pains. It can run as in the known tale 
about a man who exchanges a horse for a cow, then the cow for a sheep, and so on until he 
finds himself with nothing but a needle which he loses on the way home.  
Trade unions doubt that better social guarantees can adequately compensate a higher risk to 
lose a job.  Apply a simple logical argument. Assume that, indeed, an increment in the risk to 
lose a job can be compensated by an increment in social benefits. After a number of 
increments ("equivalent" exchanges), the risk grows into certainty, that is, loss of a job, with 
the living standard remaining intact. It implies a little motivation to work, resulting in a low 
employment incapable to cover high social expenditures. This contradiction disproves the 
equivalence of higher unemployment risks and higher social guarantees, so that the emerging 
disadvantages can be compensated only partially but never completely. 
Besides, entrusting the workers’ welfare to the welfare-giver, the state, is unreliable. Every 
political change may result in social cuts (as now in Germany). Employment protection, on 
the contrary, guarantees jobs and, consequently, a stable income even during recessions and 
political crises (Bewley 1999). Finally, non-benevolently changing jobs destroys career 
prospects. Each new employment means that one must begin from the start and establish 
oneself anew; it can be necessary to move to another place which complicates the family life.  
The conception of flexicurity as proposed by neoliberals may look fair: one commodity 
(labour rights) is exchanged for another commodity (social security), and the exchange rate 
should be negotiated. The default is however that on the neoliberals’ playing field, to which 
they invite, everything can be bought and sold (which is not always true!). This apparent 
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socially healthy?  
There are also doubts in the social fairness of flexicurity. Every step towards a higher labour 
flexibility meets interests of employers. Business gets rid of restrictions, managers improve 
performance by rotating and squeezing personnel, and firms gain higher profits. All expenses 
are recovered by the state — costly reforms and additional social security benefits. Therefore, 
such a flexibilization scenario turns out to be a long-running indirect governmental donation 
to firms. Since the state budget originates from taxpayers, the employees are the ones 
contributing to the donation.  
Therefore, trade unions are inclined to consider flexicurity as a measure to protect weak work 
forces but not at the price of charging other employees with disadvantages. The specificity of 
the trade-unionist viewpoint at flexicurity is reflected by the alternative definition below. It is 
just the one criticized by Wilthagen and Tros (2004, p. 170):  
Definition 3 (trade-unionist). [Flexicurity is] social protection for flexible work forces, 
understood as "an alternative to pure flexibilization" (Keller and Seifert 2004, p. 226), and 
"to a deregulation-only policy" (Klammer 2004, p. 283); see also WSI (2000).  
Thus, the preference of trade unions is determined primarily by the strictness of EPL, and the 
second factor, security, is considered ceteris paribus, if only the first factor remains 
invariable; see Figure 3. The preference can be imagined as a staircase with floors being the 
EPL strictness levels and each flight of stairs being the full-range ascent along the social 
security scale. This type of preference is called lexicographic by analogy with a lexicon 
which words are ordered alphabetically letter-by-letter (here, by the strictness of EPL and 
then  by the security level). The lexicographic preference has no indifference curves which 
degenerate into single points (Tangian 1991, p. 49–50). It means that a shortage of a high-
priority factor cannot be compensated by any surplus of lower-priority factors.  
According to the trade-unionist concept of flexicurity, the focus should be made at improving 
the employment and social security of flexible workers. Figure 4 shows what happens at the 
market of flexible labour forces, separately of the market of regular employment.  
The vertical indifference isolines relate to the first-priority component (EPL) in the trade-
unionist lexicographic preference, showing that up-downward changes of security are not 
important. Any deviation of policy trajectory to the left is unfavorable for trade unions, and an 
upward increment is appreciated if only the horizontal increment is negligible. 
In many cases this increase is not due to a better employment and social protection of flexibly 
employed. To a great extent it is due to the increasing share of permanently part-time 
employed. More young people and women sign part-time contracts, thereby reducing the 
share of normal employment (Austria, France, Belgium, Poland). Another factor is the 
decreasing share of self-employed since they close their business and become employees 
(France, Austria, Belgium). Thereby the share of better employment/socially protected within 
flexibly employed increases and their average employment and social security status grows. 
The greatest degression in social utility due to a decrease in the Strictness of EPL (we speak 
exclusively of flexibly employed!) is inherent in Sweden (from 42.8 to 31.6%), Denmark 
(from 31.0 to 21.9%), Germany (from 43.1 to 36.9%), Czech Republic (from 15.6 to 11.7%), 
the Netherlands (from 42.9 to 40.5%), and Portugal (from 25.4 to 24.9%). 
The degression is also caused by transitions between employment categories rather than by 
institutional changes. In Sweden the share of best-protected permanently part-time employed 
decreased from 18.3 to 14.1%, and in Denmark from 19.5 to 17.3%. In Czech Republic the 
share of well-protected permanent part-timers decreased not much (from 3.1 to 2.3%) but the 
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share of self-employed, who are not protected by labour laws, increased (from 10.7 to 15.3%). 
 
Figure 3. Lexicographic preference of trade unions with no trade-offs to follow 
 
 
 
Some positive changes in the indices for flexibly employed should not be misinterpreted. 
Most of them are caused by transitions from the group of normally employed. It is not 
necessary to emphasize that a growth in indices of flexibly employed due to transitions from 
regular employment does not make trade unions very happy.  
The key problem is that social preferences of neo-liberals and trade unions more than just 
differ, they differ in the type of preference. The former have a hill-shaped utility with gradual 
ascents/descents in every direction. Trade-unions have a stair-like utility with gradual 
ascents/descents only along the ‘flight of stairs’ but with leaps in all other directions.  The 
subject for bargaining— determining the slope of social trade-off—is questionable for trade 
unions whose preference has no indifference curves which might have a slope. 
As mentioned by Wilthagen and Tros, (2004, p. 169): "some recent studies are pessimistic 
that appropriate trade-offs can be found between flexibility and security". The problem is in 
the very existence of trade-offs: "If these levels … do not exist, negotiations and trade-offs 
are hard to envisage, because there is ‘no more/or less’ situation’" (Op. cit, p.181). 
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Figure 4. Flexibility-Security nexus for flexibly employed only (trade-unionist 
perspective) in the background of trade unions’ vertical flexicurity isolines of first priority 
 
 
 
Empirical investigation within the conception of European 
welfare state 
The definition of flexicurity as a trade-off assumes a compensation of flexibilization by 
advantages in social security. From the viewpoint of European welfare state, the key stone of 
social security is income security aimed at compensating the loss of earnings and providing 
means of existence for those who do not work. Therefore, we have to evaluate the progress in 
income security and to judge, whether it compensates the actual deregulation of labour 
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markets, as measured with the EPL-indicator of the OECD used in previous sections. 
Figure 5. Decline of European social security by 2004 after the highest peak in 1995–2003 shown by 
reduction of national Net Replacement Rates (NRR). Source: Author’s Census-Simulating Model with the 
EuroStat Labour Force Survey data and OECD Tax-Benefit Models 
 
 
 
An evaluation of income security could be based on interviewing unemployed on their in- and 
out-of-work net income. However, even if such an interview could be performed, it is 
unlikely that unemployed provided accurate figures because of complicated tax and benefit 
interactions. Besides, a number of persons may refuse to answer questions on their income. 
A possible solution is obtained with a (micro-) census simulating model which combines both 
empirical and institutional (= rule-based) and empirical (= statistical) features. It uses the 
OECD Tax-Benefit models (1998, 1999a, 2002a, 2004a, 2005) to normatively derive 
individual answers of unemployed from their personal situations (age, family type, number of 
children, previous earnings, duration of unemployment). The goal is obtaining the net-income 
replacement rates (NRR) for unemployed persons, which is the previous-to-current net 
income ratio. The statistics of personal cases is available from Eurostat (2005). It is used to 
derive the national average NRR which shows the average degree with which social benefits 
compensate the loss of previous earnings; for details see (Tangian 2005b). 
The analysis of national NRR-indicators for 22 European countries reveals that they attain 
some maximum during the period 1995–2003 and decrease by 2004, meaning “the good times 
are over”. This viewpoint is illustrated in Figure 5, showing the change of the national NRR 
by 2004 with respect to its maximum in some previous year. The bottom countries have the 
largest social security decline. The higher the country in the graph, the less the security 
decline.  
The only exception is Poland which exhibits a minor progress. However, the growth of Polish 
indicator by 0.8% occurs in the background of devaluation of the APW by 24% (Average 
production wage — used by the OECD and Eurostat as a reference of the national wage 
level). Without such devaluation, the Polish social system would decline by about 23%, so 
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that the real position of Poland in Figure 5 should be at the bottom next to Slovak Republic.  
What are the causes of the decline of European social security?  
In many countries the actual decline of social security occurs under institutional 
improvements: “Contrary to the decline in benefit amounts seen in earlier period, payment 
rates were made more generous in several countries” (OECD 2004a, p. 116). Some countries 
considerably increased their benefits and some relaxed eligibility conditions. Indeed, as 
reported by Adema and Ladaique (2005, p. 12) the social expenditure in the OECD countries 
grows with the GDP and in certain years even more rapidly.  
For instance, the dynamic of German institutional development is shown in Figure 6. Its six 
plots correspond to six levels of previous earnings: 40, 50, 67, 100, 150, and 200% APW. 
Each plot is built from seven yearly curves. All the plots are computed with the OECD Tax-
Benefit Models with no statistical data. The abrupt increase in the plot relief in 2001 indicates 
that social security benefits became more generous for all the six earning levels. At the same 
time Germany exhibits a decline of social security by 4.1% in Figure 5. A similar situation is 
inherent in many other countries; see similar plots for other European countries in (Tangian 
2005b).  
Since no institutional decline is generally observed, the only its cause is a change in personal 
situations. Recall that the personal situations are specified with family type (single, married 
couple with one earner, married couple with two earners, number of children), age, and 
employment parameters like previous earnings and duration of unemployment. According to 
Eurostat (2005), the dynamics of family types is not much changing in the recent years. The 
earnings do, but together with the GDP and social expenditure (Eurostat 2005). 
The only explanations of the decline of European social security are longer periods of 
unemployment and shorter periods of employment which disqualify employees from high 
social benefits. These phenomena follow from the flexibilization of employment relations. 
Therefore, the flexibilization results not only in employment insecurity but also in social 
insecurity, reducing the NRR due to shorter employment periods. 
In this relation, what can be said about flexicurity? As shown with the OECD indicator of 
strictness of EPL, the labour market deregulation is distinctly progressing. From the 
viewpoint of European welfarism, social security experiences a decline. Therefore, it cannot 
compensate the flexibilization as required by flexicurity. 
Discussion: policy contradictions and possible solutions 
At the moment there are several European policies which are inconsistent with each other: 
• European welfare policy which suggests certain living standards independently of 
employment. It assumes a stable labour market performance and is backed up by a 
strong social security system (Esping-Andersen 1990, Ramaux 2006).  
• Flexibilization of employment relations (3rd guideline for European Employment 
Strategy; see European Commission 2005) which implies relaxations of employment 
protection legislation.  
• Flexicurity (European Commission 2006) The compatibility with the European 
welfare tradition is imagined as a flexicurity trade-off between the relaxation of 
employment protection legislation and advances in social and employment security 
(Jepsen and Klammer 2004).  
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• Make work pay (8th guideline for European Employment strategy, European 
Commission 2005) aimed at stimulating the unemployed to active labour market 
participation. Similarly to flexicurity, the “make work pay” policy is also a trade-off,  
but between the social protection and maximizing the gain from moving to work 
(OECD 2004, p. 92). Contrary to flexicurity, the “make work pay” allows a reduction 
of security benefits.  
Figure 6. Normative Net Replacement Rate (NRR) during 1–60 months of unemployment for one of 75 
family situations (one-earner couple with 2 children, 40 year-old earner, 22 years working record) in 
Germany. Source: Author’s derivation from OECD Tax-Benefit models 
 
 
 
As follows from the very idea of trade-offs (compensation, that is, no possibility of 
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simultaneous improvements), the policies enumerated contradict each other. Since they 
interact through the social security system, their consistency means the consistency with the 
social security. Or, the social security should be made consistent with the three policies.  
The social security system has been developed for many decades. It is overcomplicated 
especially in interaction with the tax system, and it is quite difficult to change one of its 
elements without affecting others. The unprecedented decline of European social security in 
the background of institutional improvements shows that only a radical reform can make it 
actually efficient and resolve policy contradictions.  
A possible solution could be the basic minimum income model together with flexinsurance.  
The basic minimum income model assumes a flat income paid by the state to all citizens 
regardless of their earnings and property status (Keller and Seifert 2005, p. 320). The traces of 
this model appear in some social security branches like child care allowances. For instance, 
Kindergeld in Germany is paid to all parents. Some other options are practiced in Switzerland 
(Brombacher-Steiner 2000).  
The flexinsurance assumes that the employer’s contribution to social security should be 
proportional to the flexibility of the contract (Tangian 2004b). Thereby a higher risk of 
atypical employees to become unemployed will be compensated. On the other hand, such 
progressive contributions will stimulate employers to hire employees more favorably, but 
without rigidly restricting the labour market flexibility. Thereby flexinsurance can be an 
instrument for "regulating the labour market deregulation" which ongoing adjustments do not 
need legislation changes. 
The basic minimum income model in combination with the flexinsurance is consistent with 
the  European policies mentioned and thereby resolves their contradiction:  
Development of the European welfare policy. The basic minimum income model meets the 
concept of welfare state since it guarantees some unconditional living standards and 
discharges the social tension. The additional budget expenditures come from flexinsurance 
and higher taxes of high-earners (to subtract the flat income) and by the funds released from 
reducing the number of civil servants currently working in social security.  
Compensation of flexibilization by better social security according to the flexicurity 
concept. The basic minimum income model would mean a progress in social security and 
therefore meets the idea of the flexicurity trade-off “more flexibilization and more security”. 
At the same time, flexinsurance will –"softly"' regulate flexibilization,.  
Contribution to the “make work pay” policy. The basic minimum income is not reduced 
while moving to work. Therefore, there can be no situations when moving to work is little 
attractive due to losing out-of-work benefits, since every work immediately improves the net 
income.  
Finally, the European policy of respecting civil society initiatives should be mentioned. It 
assumes a significant influence of non-governmental organizations on policy-making. In 
particularly, the opinion of trade unions played always not the least role in labour market 
regulation. Constraining the total deregulation of labour markets with flexinsurance would 
mean respecting the trade-unionist position. 
Conclusions 
In spite of a visible roll-back of European social security from the level of the 1980s (Ramaux 
2006), most empirical studies fail to detect its substantial decline (Pettersen 1995, Taylor-
Gooby 1998, Roller 1999, Van Oorschot 1999, and Mau 2001). The focus made on 
governmental expenditures for social support (for references see Adema and Ladaique 2005) 
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is rather misleading because it does not take into account increasing living costs and 
flexibilization of employment relations with longer periods of unemployment and lower 
specific payoffs per capita/months. The illusion that social solidarity remains in force 
weakens the position of European welfarism and trade unions, making an impression that 
minor improvements are sufficient to adjust social security to current needs. 
Thus we have operationally defined flexicurity policies as flexibility-security directed country 
trajectories along trade-offs in the flexibility–security vector space. Flexibility is estimated 
with the OECD indicator of strictness of employment protection legislation. Security is 
estimated in three ways, depending on the viewpoint. In the neo-liberal perspective, the social 
security indicator is derived from eligibility conditions to five social security benefits as given 
by the OECD. Under the trade-unionist viewpoint, the consideration is restricted to atypically 
employed. Within the conception of European welfare state, the social security indicator 
focuses on net income replacement rates of unemployed. 
Unlike existing studies, the given article attempts to measure the level of social security with 
respect to the factual rather than institutional changes. In particular, all three models 
considered reduce the indicators to some national average values and show that institutional 
improvements do not compensate the growing size of disadvantageous social groups. A kind 
of debit-credit account shows that wins are smaller than losses and winners are fewer than 
losers. For instance, minor advantages for flexibly employed turn into great disadvantages for 
regularly employed. It results in a negative general balance, so that the concept of flexicurity 
may not be holding up to its political promises and theoretical declarations. 
A possible solution can be attained by flexinsurance — easily updatable regulation of labour 
market in the form of insurance of flexible labour — and basic minimum income model. 
Besides their contribution to flexicurity implementation, they could solve some contradictions 
between actual European policies and between employers and trade unions. 
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